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The quest to address the legacy of mass violence is a politically complex endeavor that does not 
necessarily foreground the needs or desires of victims. Indeed, victim claims may contradict the motives of 
those in power or become overshadowed by the drive to establish international legal norms and regimes of 
justice. The international push for a tribunal to hold accountable those responsible for the deaths of some 
1.7 million Cambodians from 1975-79 did not begin until after the fall of the Soviet Union. Until that time, 
Cold War politics shielded the former Khmer Rouge from prosecution; indeed a reconfigured Khmer Rouge 
coalition claimed Cambodia’s place at the United Nations even after the Vietnamese drove the brutal regime 
from power in 1979. Co-Prime Ministers Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen wrote to the UN in 1997 
requesting the creation of a tribunal — some claim to intimidate remaining Khmers Rouge into defecting to 
the current government — but changed his position soon afterward. Nonetheless, international pressure for 
a court continued and, after a series of lengthy negotiations, the Cambodian government and United Nations 
reached an agreement in 2003 to establish the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), 
more commonly known as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT). 
Hun Sen agreed to the tribunal against a backdrop of mounting international criticism of his regime’s 
widespread human rights abuses and corruption.1 Dunncan McCargo refers to the ECCC as “the play-within-
a-play” that characterized the political drama between Hun Sen and the international community.2 From the 
start, Hun Sen sought to limit the scope of prosecutions to create a narrative of the Khmer Rouge regime 
that assigned culpability to a small group of elite actors. Members of the international community pushed 
for more widespread prosecutions and sought both retributive justice and truth recovery. For transnational 
human rights organizations and a larger international community, the KRT processes are anticipated to 
produce spillover effects that would transform the judicial system, and perhaps usher in a gradual regime 
change in this impoverished country.3 Truth recovery, they also hope, would facilitate a process of national 
“reconciliation,” which is mentioned in the June 2003 agreement between the United Nations and the Royal 
Government of Cambodia.4 As the KRT draws to a close, its impact on victims, politics and international 
norms has only begun to be debated. Thirty-five years since the crimes took place and with over $200 million 
spent on two trials to date, how has this court affected justice for genocidal violence, national reconciliation, 
historical truth and the culture of impunity in Cambodia?
This special issue of Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal addresses such questions 
through new analysis and reflection. The following essays provide an even-handed analysis of the KRT’s 
contributions and limitations. The politics surrounding the court’s establishment, political interference from 
the Cambodian government and a lack of resources have all constrained the tribunal’s accomplishments, 
particularly in meeting the multitudinous needs of victims.
Alexander Hinton’s article provides insight into the significance of the KRT to victims of S-21 and how 
the “deeply personal” struggle of healing and truth seeking does not necessarily align with the priorities of 
the transitional justice community. Drawing on his unique access to late S-21 survivor Vann Nath during the 
Duch trial, Hinton emphasizes the importance of the painter’s Buddhist beliefs, arts (to educate the public 
through the painting of atrocities committed at S-21), his confrontation with a former S-21 guard, and his 
testimony against Duch.5 Vann Nath’s unique personal journey over time led him to internalize the Buddhist 
precept of karma, a cosmic justice.6
Hinton argues that the tribunal’s limited temporal jurisdiction puts forth “a ‘truth’ bleached of historical 
processes and an understanding of the factors that enable the Khmer Rouge rise to power.”7 Indeed, transitional 
justice mechanisms such as the KRT that offer sweeping promises of truth, justice, personal healing and 
national reconciliation, are bound to fail. Yet supporters push forward with such efforts as part of a “transitional 
justice imaginary.”8 In essence, practitioners and supporters of internationalized courts such as the KRT are 
incentivized to represent the court as a success both to satisfy donors and to secure their membership in the 
transitional justice community.9 In its discursive representation, this transitional justice community places 
greater emphasis on constructing a linear narrative of transition from a barbaric society to a modern liberal 
democracy. Supporters of the KRT can thus claim agency in shaping this normative discourse of human rights 
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and democracy, forging a sense of “shared belonging” to a larger transitional justice community.10 Throughout 
the KRT proceedings, complex histories of the Cambodian genocide were truncated by the court’s temporal 
jurisdiction and legal design to produce a “truth” that suits the transitional justice discourse. However, this 
kind of “truth,” as Hinton argues, “directs attention away from social praxis and the ways in which the meaning 
and understanding of such transitional justice processes are negotiated on the ground.”11
Helen Jarvis, who served as Chief of the Victims Support Section of the ECCC (widely known as Victims’ 
Unit) from June 2009 to June 2010,12 provides insight into the struggle of this small, under-resourced and under-
staffed office to meet the enormous demand for victim participation in the KRT proceedings. According to 
Jarvis, the ECCC was “completely unprepared” for direct participation by Civil Parties13, a limited form of victim 
participation and symbolic reparations that owes its existence to a 2006 negotiated compromise between judges 
from the civil and common law systems.14 The office, Jarvis suggests, was unprepared for its success, as its outreach 
campaign received active support from at least five local civil society organizations, including the Documentation 
Center of Cambodia (DC-Cam).15 As Civil Parties increased from 90 victims (22 went on to testify in court) in 
Case 001 to 3,850 in Case 002, the financial support from the ECCC could not keep pace, leaving the Civil Party 
legal representation to the mercy of donors’ goodwill.16 For the sake of efficiency, the Plenary Session of judicial 
officers revised the court’s Internal Rules in February 2010, consolidating Civil Party representation in Case 002, 
a much more complex undertaking than Case 001.17 In Jarvis’ view, this new approach provided a “more coherent 
framework for Civil Party legal representation” because “individual Civil Parties still retained their own co-lawyers, 
and “the Lead Co-Lawyers gave opportunities to these co-lawyers to speak in court.”18
Referencing The Long-Awaited Day, a video made for the Victims’ Unit, Jarvis contends that victims who 
participate in the KRT are motivated by a search for justice, acknowledgement of Khmer Rouge atrocities and 
dissemination of historical truth for younger generations.19 The participation of some 4,000 Civil Parties may 
be considered one of the ECCC’s main contributions to the development of transitional justice. Yet, as Jarvis 
concludes, had the issue of victim participation been given “sufficient attention and weight at the time of the 
establishment of the court,” a great deal of anxiety, disappointment, and suspicion could have been avoided.20
Wendy Lambourne makes a convincing case that despite its flaws, the ECCC does have a meaningful role 
to play, especially when coupled with NGO-led processes. Drawing on data gathered from interviews in 2009, 
she weighs the ECCC’s positive impact, particularly the “symbolic and psychological benefits of survivors of 
having their suffering officially acknowledge at last”21 with its severe limitations in transforming domestic 
legal capacity and the local rule of law. Echoing Jarvis, Lambourne emphasizes the importance of “official 
acknowledgement” by the tribunal of Khmer Rouge crimes and of victims’ suffering. However, she underscores 
the fact that the court is by design ill-equipped for “truth recovery” and, perhaps worse, limits opportunities 
for former Khmer Rouge leaders’ acknowledgement of wrongdoings, which might provide some closure to 
victims.22 Notably, she argues for “a more pragmatic approach to international justice that closely responds 
to the perceptions and expressed needs of locally affected communities.”23 Lambourne goes on to question 
both the rationale and benefit of pursuing cases beyond Case 002, as many human rights organizations desire. 
Relying on her interviews with survivors in January-February 2009, and surveys conducted by DC-Cam 
around the same time, she doubts that the majority of Cambodians would welcome an expansion of the cases 
under investigation.24
Legal scholar Randle DeFalco makes a strong case that the five suspects under investigation in Cases 003 
and 004 qualify as “most responsible” for crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge. These include Meas Muth 
(Army General), Sou Met (Army General), Ta An (Deputy Secretary of the Central Zone), Im Chaem (District 
Chief), and Ta Tith (Deputy Secretary of the Northwest Zone). DeFalco uses the examples of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and International Criminal 
Court to demonstrate a relatively consistent set of criteria that qualify those “most responsible” according to 
the suspect’s seniority and gravity and scale of offenses committed.25 DeFalco suggests that political motives 
offer a powerful potential explanation for Cambodian resistance to Cases 003 and 004; in addition, financial 
concerns may be sapping the interest of foreign donors.26
Donald Beachler argues that the significant limitations of the KRT are hardly surprising when one closely 
examines the political underpinnings of the court.27 For Beachler, the confluence of Realpolitik considerations and 
vested national interests dictates against a more complete process of justice and truth recovery. Many Western 
governments, including the United States, lack the political will to push for trials beyond Case 002. In fact, Beachler 
suggests that such governments have used Hun Sen’s political interference in the court’s judicial independence as an 
excuse for their “non-committal” stance on the issue of whether Cases 003/004 should be pursued.28
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Two major world powers – namely China and the United States – are far more interested in persuading 
the Hun Sen government to support their strategic interests than they are in pushing for additional cases at the 
KRT. China needs Cambodia’s support in its dispute with Vietnam and the Philippines over the South China 
Sea; meanwhile, the core interests of the United States and its Asian ally Japan have shifted in recent years 
from a focus on human rights and democracy to anti-terrorism, anti-drug trafficking, and countering China’s 
influence.29 The sobering lesson, as Beachler concludes, is that “politicians on national and international stages 
acted largely in their own self and national interests with regard to the ECCC. […]. The Cambodian genocide 
trials are hardly the first time that the imperatives of Realpolitik triumphed over concerns for truth and justice 
in matters of genocide and other mass killings.”30
Most contributors to this volume conclude that the KRT can reveal only partial truths relating to the 
Cambodian genocide and that its legal proceedings are unlikely to improve the rule of law or culture of 
impunity in Cambodia. Nonetheless, the court may provide symbolic and psychological benefits to victims as 
they seek closure, an evolving and deeply personal process. We hope these pieces will help provide insight into 
the impact of the KRT thus far, even though we can only begin to assess its long-term legacy.
Kosal Path, Elena Lesley-Rozen
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